

# TARGETED ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION MECHANISMS

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of the mechanisms states use to target specifically vulnerable groups in an economic reconstruction plan in post-conflict states. This chapter also outlines the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement related to economic reconstruction and provides sample language parties may wish to consider when drafting provisions for economic reconstruction.

Economic reconstruction is critical to sustain peace and stability after a prolonged conflict. Many experts agree that ensuring the inclusion of all sectors of society is essential to that success. For this reason, many post-conflict economic reconstruction plans target specific vulnerable segments of the population to ensure their integration into the economic reconstruction process. Groups frequently selected for targeted economic reconstruction efforts are: former combatants, internally displaced persons, women, minority populations, and other traditionally disenfranchised groups. The unique circumstances of each group may require targeted strategies to facilitate the groups' integration into the overall economic reconstruction framework.

The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) includes broad provisions calling for progressive economic policy, a provision of a fund for economic reconstruction, and an elaborate former combatant reintegration plan. The DPA provides for a general reconstruction fund with initial funds of \$300 million from the National Revenue Fund, \$200 million in 2007 and 2008 to be provided by the Government of Sudan, and funds from international donors.<sup>1</sup> The DPA provides targeted reconstruction funds for the reintegration of former combatants.<sup>2</sup>

## CORE ELEMENTS

### Former Combatants

Former combatants often face difficulties integrating into the formal economy due to a lack of both marketable skills and community acceptance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, paras. 153-54, May 5, 2006, *available at* [http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA\\_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf](http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf) (last accessed Sept. 20, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 29.

Economic reconstruction programs targeting former combatants use various mechanisms including reintegration funds, job training programs, and incorporation of former combatants into defense and police forces.

### *Reintegration Funds and Job Training Programs*

Reintegration funds aim to provide financial support to former combatants. Funds for such programs may come from either the government or the international community.<sup>3</sup> In Aceh, Indonesia, a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement established the reintegration fund. The Aceh reintegration fund earmarks money and farming land for former combatants who can demonstrate loss due to the conflict.<sup>4</sup>

Reintegration funds may also support job training. For example, one of the primary purposes of Papua New Guinea's Bougainville Ex-Combatants Trust Account (BETA) was to support job training and business development programs and to provide seed capital for agricultural and other businesses.<sup>5</sup> BETA also permitted widows of former combatants to apply for benefits. While the fund was generally successful in providing former combatants with job skills and employment, it also faced complications in defining which persons qualified as former combatants.<sup>6</sup>

Whether made possible by reintegration funds or alternative sources, well-crafted job training programs are often instrumental in providing sustainable employment for former combatants. In Liberia, programs offered diverse skills training to former combatants. The training offered did not match market needs, however and many believe that this gap led to the decision of some former combatants to rearm.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> For example, the Australian government funded the reintegration fund in Bougainville and the Swedish government provided some funding for the reintegration fund in Liberia.

<sup>4</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (2005), art. 3.2.5, *available at* [http://www.thejakartapost.com/RI\\_GAM\\_MOU.pdf](http://www.thejakartapost.com/RI_GAM_MOU.pdf) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].

<sup>5</sup> UNIFEM, CASE STUDY: BOUGAINVILLE – PAPUA NEW GUINEA (2003), *available at* <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/bougainville/docs/ddrboug.doc> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>6</sup> UNIFEM, CASE STUDY: BOUGAINVILLE – PAPUA NEW GUINEA (2003).

<sup>7</sup> UN PRESS RELEASE, UN REPORTS SLOW PROGRESS IN LIBERIA RECONSTRUCTION, Feb. 2004, *available at* <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afr984.doc.htm> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina's Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) developed a labor market information database to match skills of unemployed displaced workers with specific needs of emerging, restarting, or expanding businesses.<sup>8</sup> This information, in conjunction with job counseling and the granting of contracts to businesses that conducted retraining services, resulted in 17,000 former combatants receiving job training. Seventy-four percent of those trained obtained employment.<sup>9</sup> However, many of those worked in labor-intensive jobs relating to reconstruction of Bosnia. Those jobs were not sustainable as reconstruction contracts eventually ended. As a result, the more sustainable jobs in Bosnia are those associated with small private companies, even though they trained a smaller number of former combatants than the large reconstruction companies.<sup>10</sup>

In Sierra Leone, the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) jointly established reintegration programs for former combatants. One program included a six-month skills training program, basic education, and a stipend of US \$28 per month for the duration of the training program.<sup>11</sup> However, after the initial post-conflict period some participants could not find employment due to economic stagnation in Sierra Leone.

Using an alternative method, employment programs in Aceh, Indonesia, respond to the interests of former combatants. One program solicits, approves, and

---

<sup>8</sup> TOBIAS PIETZ, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOLDIERS IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (2004), at 37.

<sup>9</sup> TOBIAS PIETZ, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOLDIERS IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (2004), at 41.

<sup>10</sup> TOBIAS PIETZ, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOLDIERS IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (2004), at 43.

<sup>11</sup> Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (1999), *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra\\_leone\\_07071999\\_toc.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Agreement]; UNAMSIL: THE STORY BEHIND THE SUCCESS IN SIERRA LEONE, UN PRESS KIT, May 29, 2003, *available at* <http://www.un.org/events/peacekeepers/2003/docs/sierraleone.htm> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

funds proposals from former armed Free Aceh Movement members.<sup>12</sup> Because the capacity and skill base of many former combatants is low, additional training is necessary for successful implementation of their proposals.<sup>13</sup> A similar project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project (PELRP), responded to the interests of former combatants. Participants attended a course on small-scale business development and then had seven weeks to develop and submit a business plan.<sup>14</sup> To receive funding, the plan must be sustainable and have the potential to create new jobs. Of the fifty proposals approved, only one was a failed program.<sup>15</sup>

### *Incorporating Former Combatants into Defense Forces*

When accompanied by training, programs to integrate former combatants into defense forces increase the productivity of the forces and better the prospects of former combatants in finding sustainable employment. In Aceh, Indonesia, former combatants may serve in police and military forces after they receive police and security training and human rights education. Former combatants joining security forces in Angola did not receive training, but they had to meet strict physical fitness and literacy standards.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, the government of the Philippines waived traditional requirements for admission into the police and armed forces to promote the integration of former combatants.

In efforts to employ former combatants quickly, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front agreed that former combatants could enter national armed forces if they met established criteria. This resulted in a military force beyond the country's needs. In Angola, the government and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) limited the total number of

---

<sup>12</sup> WORLD BANK CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ACEH CONFLICT MONITORING UPDATE, Jun.-Jul. 2006, at 3.

<sup>13</sup> WORLD BANK CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ACEH CONFLICT MONITORING UPDATE, Jun.-Jul. 2006, at 3.

<sup>14</sup> TOBIAS PIETZ, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOLDIERS IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (2004), at 47, 51-52.

<sup>15</sup> TOBIAS PIETZ, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOLDIERS IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (2004), at 52.

<sup>16</sup> Lusaka Protocol (Angola 1994), Annex 5, *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/lusaka\\_11151994\\_annex.html#5](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/lusaka_11151994_annex.html#5) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

soldiers that could integrate into the Angolan Armed Forces.<sup>17</sup> However, former UNITA combatants filled less than half of the military spots available.

Concerns about disloyalty may arise in forces that integrate former combatants who previously fought on opposing sides. In Aceh, Indonesia, only native Acehnese may serve in the military, which reduces the risk of having armed forces with conflicting loyalties.<sup>18</sup> In the Philippines, the former rebel combatants initially organized into separate units and fully integrated once trust developed. More than 11,000 former combatants successfully integrated into Philippine security and police forces in this manner.<sup>19</sup>

Kosovo initiated a unique job placement program for former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants. Because NATO held military control of Kosovo, former KLA combatants could not incorporate into a national military. Instead, Kosovo formed the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian agency mandated to help with reconstruction efforts and provide emergency help under natural or human-made disasters.<sup>20</sup> Former combatants who entered the KPC performed such duties as rebuilding hospitals and clearing obstructed roads.

## **Internally Displaced Persons**

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) often require targeted economic reconstruction. Efforts to reintegrate IDPs socially by assuring access to land have proven insufficient measures to integrate them into the economy. Skills training and assistance with job placement often help reintegrate IDPs.

### *Land and Home Ownership*

---

<sup>17</sup> JOÃO GOMES AND IMOGEN PARSONS, SUSTAINING THE PEACE IN ANGOLA: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION, MONOGRAPH NO. 83 (April 2003), available at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No83/Chap3.html> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Understanding, Section 1.4.4.

<sup>19</sup> Peace Agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (1996), available at [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/philippines/peace\\_agree\\_07181996.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/philippines/peace_agree_07181996.html) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>20</sup> UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO, KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS, available at <http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/kpcorps.htm> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

Many IDPs return to partially or completely destroyed homes. Experts argue that stable employment—and thereby integration into long-term economic reconstruction programs—is unlikely for those groups who do not have a home. In the 1990s, the Lebanese government created a Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD). The CFD distributed up to US \$20,000 for reconstruction of completely destroyed IDPs' homes of IDPs and up to US \$12,000 for homes that were only partially damaged.<sup>21</sup>

Access to land is particularly critical in Burundi, where more than 90 percent of the citizens depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Protocol IV of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi provides for the creation of reception committees to give support for the socio-economic reintegration of IDPs and refugees.<sup>22</sup> The Protocol specifically provides that displaced persons must be able to recover their land or, if recovery is impossible, receive fair compensation.<sup>23</sup> However, vague land ownership laws and absence of private property rights in Burundi has exacerbated tensions over “rightful ownership” of land.<sup>24</sup>

### *Job Training and Employment Opportunities*

---

<sup>21</sup> THE MIGRATION NETWORK, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND IDPS, *available at* <http://www.lnf.org.lb/migrationnetwork/lebgov.html> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>22</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000), *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa\\_burundi\\_08282000\\_pr4ch1.html#1](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_pr4ch1.html#1) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>23</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

<sup>24</sup> Mariam Bibi Jooma, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, WE CAN'T EAT THE CONSTITUTION: TRANSFORMATION AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF BURUNDI (2005), *available at* <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/106/Paper106.htm> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

In recent years, several states have initiated job training programs and employment opportunities for IDPs. With the support of the United Nations Development Programme, Lebanon's Ministry for the Displaced created an integrated plan for villages where IDPs would return.<sup>25</sup> The plan focused economic opportunities in agricultural development, handicrafts, and micro-credit income generation projects, in conjunction with social services and development of local infrastructure.<sup>26</sup>

In Colombia, programs implemented by local and international NGOs and aid organizations successfully trained more than 93,000 individuals and created more than 60,000 jobs for displaced persons.<sup>27</sup> Job skills trainings and job placement programs in Colombia responded to identified demands within the private sector. In one program, the IDPs received a modest wage subsidy in the form of a transportation allowance during their on-the-job training. In addition, IDPs were included in the national Social Security program.<sup>28</sup>

Community Based Production Centers in the Forest Region of Guinea assist IDPs and refugees in creating small-scale village industries. The Centers offer apprenticeship programs, intensive skills upgrading, and workshops on village industry.<sup>29</sup> Many in the host communities rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. To prevent conflict with the host communities, the IDP programs targeted non-agricultural industries. Instead, village industries use locally available resources and aim to produce goods for the local markets. Programs include metalworking,

---

<sup>25</sup> THE MIGRATION NETWORK, THE UN AND IDPS, *available at* <http://www.lnf.org.lb/migrationnetwork/unnidp.html> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>26</sup> THE MIGRATION NETWORK, THE UN AND IDPS.

<sup>27</sup> PAN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION'S IDP-PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA, *available at* [http://www.padf.org/portal/alias\\_\\_Rainbow/lang\\_\\_en/tabID\\_\\_3496/DesktopDefault.aspx](http://www.padf.org/portal/alias__Rainbow/lang__en/tabID__3496/DesktopDefault.aspx); United States Agency for International Development's IDP-related programs in Colombia, *available at* [www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/33663.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/33663.htm) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>28</sup> CHF INTERNATIONAL, LINKING DISPLACED POPULATIONS TO PRIVATE SECTOR OPPORTUNITIES IN COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF DELYMP IN ALTOS DE CAZUCÁ, MUNICIPALITY OF SOACHA, CUNDINAMARCA, *available at* [www.chfhq.org/content/general/detail/3012](http://www.chfhq.org/content/general/detail/3012) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>29</sup> UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, UNIDO COMMUNITY BASED PRODUCTION CENTRES IN FOREST GUINEA SUPPORTED BY JAPAN'S UN TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN SECURITY (2005), *available at* <http://www.unido.org/doc/44308> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

soap making, woodworking, weaving, tailoring, hairdressing, and handicrafts.<sup>30</sup> The village industries both provide sustainable income for displaced persons and boost the village economy.

## **Women**

Within many societies, traditionally defined gender roles often lead to inequalities between men and women, particularly with regard to economic capacity. As a practical outcome, women are less likely to enjoy access to education and advanced skills training. Women also often lack property rights and legal protections in the workplace. Women enjoy significantly lower levels of economic productivity and economic security as compared to men. Thus, women living in post-conflict societies face unique obstacles and as a result have become recipients of targeted economic reconstruction.

### *Gender Perspectives in Economic Development Policies*

Official policies and priorities set forth in post-conflict economic development plans define the basic form and function of the economic reconstruction process. One model focuses on defining women as a priority group to receive special attention in post-conflict economic development legislative and policy schemes. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi took this approach. Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement names women as a priority group with special needs to address during the process of reconstruction and development.<sup>31</sup>

Some governments created special ministries or cabinets within the government structure to advance women's economic development initiatives. For example, the Cambodian Ministry of Women's and Veteran's Affairs initiated the Cambodian National Council for Women, which among other things sought to increase women's educational, economic and productive capacity.

### *Micro-Credit Programs*

---

<sup>30</sup> UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, UNIDO COMMUNITY BASED PRODUCTION CENTRES IN FOREST GUINEA SUPPORTED BY JAPAN'S UN TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN SECURITY (2005).

<sup>31</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

Another popular program used to support women during post-conflict economic reconstruction is micro-credit loans. Micro-credit loan initiatives seek to give women access to the capital necessary to fund small business endeavors, ideally without the burden of overwhelming debt repayments. However, many factors influence the success of micro-credit initiatives.<sup>32</sup>

One major hindrance to the success of micro-credit initiatives is the lack of education and business management skills among women. Without basic business skills (and in some cases, literacy) many women cannot successfully manage their enterprises and end up defaulting on their loans. The most successful micro-credit models for women therefore incorporate an education aspect into their loan programs. In Rwanda, women who received micro-credit loans under the successful “Credit with Education” program also benefited from a broad educational program, covering everything from business administration and management skills, to literacy and family planning.<sup>33</sup>

Another key to a successful micro-credit program is its adaptability to the prevailing reality. In Eritrea, for instance, a successful micro-credit program designed to meet the needs of female former combatants found that far fewer women participated in the program than originally expected.<sup>34</sup> After identifying a “lack of information and unfamiliarity with money matters,” a female former combatant went door, educating other women about the micro-credit initiative.<sup>35</sup> Those women who then participated in the micro-credit program also received

---

<sup>32</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 127, *available at* [http://oldwww.parliament.gov.za/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/PARLIAMENTARY\\_INFORMATION/PUBLICATIONS/UNIFEM/chapter10.pdf](http://oldwww.parliament.gov.za/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/PARLIAMENTARY_INFORMATION/PUBLICATIONS/UNIFEM/chapter10.pdf) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007). Micro-credit projects targeted at increasing women’s economic potential are not without criticism. Some critics argue that focusing on the small-scale loans without consideration of broader financial opportunities falls short of addressing the issue of women’s poverty. Some proposals include access to financial markets and institutions, as well as better networking and information sharing techniques. This criticism, as well as the successful models mentioned above, may be worth consideration in deciding whether a micro-credit initiative is appropriate as part of a post-conflict economic reconstruction initiative targeted at women’s economic development.

<sup>33</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 126-27.

<sup>34</sup> Nathalie de Waterville, WORLD BANK, AFRICA WORKING PAPER SERIES, ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS (2002), at 12, *available at* <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find227.pdf#search=%22Addressing%20gender%20issues%20in%20demobilization%20and%20reintegration%20programs%22> (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>35</sup> Nathalie de Waterville, WORLD BANK, AFRICA WORKING PAPER SERIES, ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS (2002).

business management and administration training. The program encouraged the women to organize and collectively address the gender-based challenges they faced in running their businesses,<sup>36</sup> and even allowed group-liability schemes for women who had little or no access to initial collateral for their loans.<sup>37</sup>

### *Capacity Building: Education and Non-Traditional Vocational and Business Skills*

The gap in education between men and women often inhibits women's ability to participate fully in post-conflict economic reconstruction schemes. Education is therefore another element often included in strategies targeting women's economic development. The "Food for Training" program in Eritrea offers adult literacy and vocational skills training to women, and compensates them for their time with basic food staples.<sup>38</sup> In Bosnia and Herzegovina, an innovative program incorporates rehabilitative counseling along with educational and vocational training at an education center for young women traumatized during the conflict.<sup>39</sup>

Other programs focus on training women in non-traditional vocational and business management skills. Such programs not only diversify the women's skills sets, but also challenge the traditional gender roles, which many see as limiting women's full integration into the economy.<sup>40</sup> For instance, Liberian refugee women living in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana trained in brick making and construction, built many of the houses, schools, and women's centers in the

---

<sup>36</sup> Nathalie de Waterville, WORLD BANK, AFRICA WORKING PAPER SERIES, ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS (2002), at 12. For instance, the provision of day care services for the women with children.

<sup>37</sup> Nathalie de Waterville, WORLD BANK, AFRICA WORKING PAPER SERIES, ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS (2002), at 12.

<sup>38</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 12 (reporting a joint program initiated by the World Food Program and the National Union of Eritrean Women (NEUW)). The program recognizes the fact that the women must take time off from their productive activities in order to attend class, and as such, offers the equivalent compensation in foodstuffs.

<sup>39</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 133.

<sup>40</sup> Some women have identified a need for training in highly non-traditional sectors. In Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, women interviewed specifically requested training in computer and other high-technology skills. Chapter 10.

refugee camp.<sup>41</sup> Women artisan weavers in East Timor organized for collective production and planned to export their textiles.<sup>42</sup>

### *Women's Rights: Property and Labor*

Another barrier to women's full integration into economic reconstruction arises from a lack of legal protections related to property and fair labor conditions. Particularly in agricultural-based societies, a woman's inability to own or inherit property often results in her inability to participate in immediate post-conflict subsistence and income-generating farming activities. Without legal guarantees to property ownership, the economic future of many women remains uncertain. In response, many post-conflict governments adopt specific legislation protecting women's right to property. Eritrea adopted specific prohibitions against gender-based discrimination in land ownership.<sup>43</sup> The Rwandan parliament's gender desk won the adoption of laws allowing women to inherit property from their deceased husbands and parents.<sup>44</sup>

Women's labor rights are also limited in many post-conflict situations.<sup>45</sup> Women working in either the formal or the informal economy often incur various forms of sex-based discrimination and other abusive labor practices. Many post-conflict legislative reforms, therefore, incorporate specific protections against sex-based discrimination.<sup>46</sup> In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the frequency of employer labor abuses against women workers inspired a program providing free labor-related legal advice and political bargaining training to women factory workers.<sup>47</sup>

## **Minorities and Disenfranchised Groups**

---

<sup>41</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 132. This project was done in conjunction with UNIFEM.

<sup>42</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 132. This project was done in conjunction with UNIFEM.

<sup>43</sup> Nathalie de Waterville, WORLD BANK, AFRICA WORKING PAPER SERIES, ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES IN DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS (2002), at 13.

<sup>44</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 130. These laws also allowed women to recover property from the male relatives of their deceased husbands.

<sup>45</sup> For more information on women's rights see the Women's Rights chapter of this guide.

<sup>46</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

<sup>47</sup> 122 CHAPTER 10: RECONSTRUCTION, at 131.

Minorities and disenfranchised segments of the population are also subject to economic discrimination under traditional social structures.<sup>48</sup> In a post-conflict context, these groups may easily fall outside an economic reconstruction plan without special measures to ensure their fullest participation. Targeted strategies recognizing the underlying issues faced by minority groups may help these segments of the population to benefit from post-conflict economic reconstruction.

### *Commitment to Removing Economic Disparities*

One government strategy to alleviate socio-economic pressures during post-conflict reconstruction is to first officially acknowledge the disadvantages facing the minority group in question, and then commit to undertake initiatives to eliminate those disadvantages. As part of a 2003 reaffirmation of the Good Friday interim peace agreement, the British government openly acknowledged economic “discrepancies” affecting the people of Northern Ireland. The British government then committed to adopting measures aimed at combating unemployment and progressively eliminating the discrepancies in unemployment rates between the two communities. In doing so, the British government not only demonstrated a high level of commitment to the peace and reconstruction processes, but also committed to reducing the disparate socio-economic conditions underlying the conflict.

### *Allocation of Natural Resources and Economic Powers*

One principle strategy for encouraging the fullest inclusion of minorities and disenfranchised groups into the post-conflict reconstruction process lies in the allocation of natural resources and economic powers. By allowing minorities and other traditionally disenfranchised groups a degree of control over the economic resources, governments may improve these groups’ engagement in the reconstruction process as well as in the broader post-conflict peace process.

In the 2005 Peace Agreement between the Indonesian government and the Aceh Province, Aceh received limited control over the proceeds from the area’s natural resources, as well as the related economic controls. For instance, the agreement gave Aceh the right to impose and collect taxes, as well as to pursue direct foreign investment in the province. Aceh also received 70 percent of

---

<sup>48</sup> For more information on Minority rights see Minority Rights chapter in this guide.

revenues generated from the natural resources in the province, including those generated from the surrounding sea.

In Kosovo, the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo accounted for minority interests in relations to economic powers.<sup>49</sup> The agreement incorporated the terms “equality,” “non-discrimination,” and “vulnerable social groups” into the provisions relating to the allocation of funds during the interim peace period. The agreement also acknowledged the vulnerability of certain socio-economic groups and afforded ethnic minorities a certain stake in their own economic concerns.<sup>50</sup>

### **DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT**

The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) includes broad language committing the government to pursue “full employment through sound policies that focus on the stability of price and employment levels and promote sustainable pro-poor economic growth.”<sup>51</sup> It recognizes the importance of sound macroeconomic policies and promotion of the private sector, research and development, agriculture, industry, and export growth.<sup>52</sup>

The parties further agree to pursue economic recovery in Darfur by integrating the province’s economy with the rest of the state, achieving sustainable growth, eradicating poverty, creating job opportunities, creating mechanisms for good governance, and investing in infrastructure, social services, and alternative energy sources.<sup>53</sup>

### **General Reconstruction Fund**

To achieve reconstruction goals, the DPA provides for revenue transfers to local economies from the National Revenue Fund, in addition to the creation of a “Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund.”<sup>54</sup> The funds include US \$300 million from the National Revenue Fund, at least US \$200 million each year from

---

<sup>49</sup> The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (1999), *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo\\_rambouillet.html#chap4a](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo_rambouillet.html#chap4a).

<sup>50</sup> The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.

<sup>51</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, para. 135.

<sup>52</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, paras. 136-44.

<sup>53</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, para. 147.

<sup>54</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, paras. 151-52.

the Government of Sudan in 2007 and 2008, and funds solicited from international donors.<sup>55</sup> The Government of Sudan further committed itself to commit funds as needed until 2015 with the “overall objective of achieving the [Millennium Development Goals].”<sup>56</sup> The fund includes a component targeted at the “creation of investment opportunities, enhancement of productive capacities, provision of credit, production inputs and capacity building for women.”<sup>57</sup>

## **Former Combatants**

The DPA provides for the integration of former rebel group combatants into the “Sudanese armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and security services.”<sup>58</sup> Providing for the “integration, disarmament, demobilization and social and economic reintegration and the reform of selected national security institutions,” Article 29 of the Darfur Peace Agreement sets forth a plan to address the targeted needs of integration of former combatants into a unified community.<sup>59</sup> This plan includes the creation of a Commission focused on “security forces integration; former combatant disarmament and demobilization; and social and economic reintegration of former combatants.”<sup>60</sup>

## **Internally Displaced Persons**

The Darfur Peace Agreement does not contain an economic reconstruction plan specifically for displaced persons beyond basic provisions for resettlement, protection, and compensation.

### **SAMPLE LANGUAGE**

#### **Article XXX**

#### **Objectives**

- (1) Recognizing the importance of the issues relating to the overall problem of economic reconstruction and development, including those associated with

---

<sup>55</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, paras. 153-54.

<sup>56</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, para. 153.

<sup>57</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 19, para. 153.

<sup>58</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 12, para. 80.

<sup>59</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 29.

<sup>60</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 29, para. 391.

rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons and former combatants, a comprehensive economic strategy shall have the following objectives:

- (a) To ensure economic integration and a security for economic development, former combatants shall have opportunities for training and to join the Sudanese army, as well as alternatives to join civilian life;<sup>61</sup>
- (b) To make certain that returning displaced persons, from inside and outside of Sudan, and all war-affected Darfurians shall have available to them job training, employment opportunities, health services, and funds for reestablishing their livelihoods;
- (c) To protect the equal rights of women, the disabled and other marginalized groups to earn a living; and
- (d) To generally revitalize and improve the economy of Darfur.

### **Article XXX** **Former Combatants**

This Article provides for integration, disarmament, demobilization, social and economic reintegration, and the reform of selected national security institutions.<sup>62</sup>

### **Article XXX** **Economic Assistance for Affected or Vulnerable Groups**

#### *Principals of Reconstruction*

- (1) Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Darfur is a priority; to that end, steps shall be taken to compensate the people of Darfur and address grievances for lives lost, assets destroyed or stolen, and suffering caused.<sup>63</sup> Mere compensation, however, is insufficient to revitalize and develop the economy.
- (2) The Parties agree that Darfur as a whole, and in particular those areas in need of construction or reconstruction, shall be brought up to the level that

---

<sup>61</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 29.

<sup>62</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 29. For more extensive analysis and sample language on reintegration of former combatants, see chapter on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in this guide.

<sup>63</sup> Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 17, para. 101.

will allow them to reach the Millennium Development Goals rapidly. A program for development of basic infrastructure shall be formulated to integrate Darfur with the rest of the economy.<sup>64</sup>

- (3) The Government shall ensure, through special assistance, the protection, rehabilitation and advancement of vulnerable groups, namely child heads of families, orphans, street children, unaccompanied minors, traumatized children, widows, women heads of families, juvenile delinquents, the physically and mentally disabled, etc.<sup>65</sup>

### *Implementing Mechanisms*

- (1) The Government will establish within [time period] of signing this agreement a National Commission for Economic Reconstruction and Development, which shall have the mandate of organizing and coordinating, together with international organizations to assist in the reconstruction of the economy of the province.
- (2) The Commission will be comprised of [two representatives from each Party, two representatives designated by the displaced persons population, one representative from [a strategic state] and two representatives of donors, cooperating bodies and international agencies OR as determined by the Parties].<sup>66</sup>
- (3) Members of the Commission must be recognized as possessing a high moral standing.<sup>67</sup>
- (4) The Commission shall meet as often as required, but no less frequently than [once a month]. Meetings of the Commission may be convened at the

---

<sup>64</sup> This language is drawn from the Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 17, para. 104.

<sup>65</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, art. 10 (2000), *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa\\_burundi\\_08282000\\_pr4ch1.html#1](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_pr4ch1.html#1) (last accessed Sept. 20, 2007).

<sup>66</sup> This language is drawn from Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict, art. 9.2, June 17, 1994, *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat\\_940617.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat_940617.html) (last accessed Sept. 20, 2007).

<sup>67</sup> The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, art. IX, Dec. 14, 1995, *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/dayton\\_gfa.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/dayton_gfa.html) (last accessed Sept. 20, 2007).

request of any of the members and shall be held [as determined by the Parties], except as the members of the Commission may otherwise agree.

- (5) The Parties agree to guarantee the personal security of the members of the Commission and personnel involved in the activities agreed.<sup>68</sup>
- (6) The Commission shall have its headquarters in [location], and may have offices at other locations, as it deems appropriate.
- (7) The first meeting of the Commission shall be scheduled [date].
- (8) The Commission shall have appropriate facilities and professionally competent staff, experienced in administrative, financial, banking, and legal matters, to assist in carrying out its functions.
- (9) The staff shall be headed by an Executive Officer, who shall be appointed by the Commission.<sup>69</sup> The Commission shall report to [authority].

#### *Functions of the Commission*

- (1) The Commission shall draw up a plan of priorities to assist through investments in:
  - (a) General Infrastructure (housing, water supply systems, health facilities, and educational facilities);
  - (b) The rural sector;
  - (c) The private sector; and
  - (d) The social sector (education services, health services, and employment services).
- (2) The Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with this agreement, as may be necessary to carry out its functions within [time period].<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, para. 8, Apr. 4, 1994, available at [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/georgia/georgia\\_quad\\_19940504.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/georgia/georgia_quad_19940504.html) (last accessed Sept. 20, 2007).

<sup>69</sup> This language is drawn from The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, art. IX, Dec. 14, 1995.

<sup>70</sup> This language is drawn from The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, art. XV, Dec. 14, 1995.

- (3) The Commission shall further seek to strengthen existing social welfare programmes designed to alleviate extreme poverty. Additional external resources shall be sought for this purpose.<sup>71</sup>
- (4) The Commission will work in cooperation with the Refugee Return Commission and Compensation Commissions to provide opportunities to returning refugees to receive material needs, and have access to training and education, health, finance, and employment needs.

### *Support and Assistance*

- (1) A special fund for reconstruction and development of Darfur shall be established under this Agreement.
- (2) The Government will provide funds to the Commission in the amount of [amount] per year.
- (3) Implementation of all the reforms and programmes contained in the Agreement will require financial support from donors.<sup>72</sup> The Parties to this agreement request and invite the international community to provide financial, technical, and material support and resources to ensure that the resettlement process takes place fully, efficiently, and with respect to dignity, safety, security for the returnees. The Parties recognize that without such assistance, any economic reconstruction and development programs will be very difficult to implement.
- (4) The Parties are committed to cooperating by all means necessary to ensure that the resources contributed are used for the benefit of the uprooted population.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> This language is drawn from the Peace Agreement of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Chapultepec, El Salvador Chapter V, Economic and Social Questions, Jan. 16, 1992, *available at* [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/el\\_salvador/pa\\_es\\_01161992\\_toc.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/el_salvador/pa_es_01161992_toc.html) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).

<sup>72</sup> This language is drawn from The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Protocol V, art. 10 (2000)

<sup>73</sup> This language is drawn from the Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict, Part V, paras. 3, 6, June 17, 1994; General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Protocol III, art. IV, para. b, Oct. 4, 1992, *available at*

---

[http://www.usip.org/library/pa/mozambique/mozambique\\_1991-92\\_toc.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/mozambique/mozambique_1991-92_toc.html) (last accessed Sept. 21, 2007).