



PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP

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SECURITY AND DEMILITARIZATION

Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook

Prepared By

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USER'S GUIDE

The Public International Law & Policy Group's (PILPG) Peace Agreement Drafter's Handbook is a comprehensive guide on how to draft a peace agreement based upon comparative analysis of over sixty peace agreements in the past thirty years. This Handbook is intended to assist drafters, mediators, negotiators, and anyone else interested in the substantive and practical contents contained in peace agreements. The Handbook is designed to facilitate drafting peace agreements quickly, efficiently, and effectively.

The Handbook sets out for the drafter the essential components found in the majority of peace agreements since approximately sixty to seventy percent of all peace agreements draw on similar elements and language. However, every conflict is unique and the drafter may have to make adjustments to certain elements to enhance the agreement's relevancy and applicability to a particular conflict. Therefore, each chapter should be considered as ad hoc and reshaping the new agreement to address the nuances of each party's needs will be necessary. Similarly, the comparative provisions and sample language provided in the Handbook are by no means exclusive, recommended, or mandatory. The purpose of the Handbook is to assist a drafter prepare a well-crafted agreement and enhance the durability of future agreements by drawing upon the best practices from prior agreements.

The Handbook consists of several chapters all following the same basic format. Each chapter focuses on a particular section commonly found in peace agreements such as ceasefires, economic restructuring, and property restitution. Each chapter first identifies the basic elements in that particular section of a peace agreement. For example, in ceasefires, the basic elements include the identification and definition of prohibited acts, separation of forces, and verification, supervision, and monitoring. The primary notes found in each chapter provide a brief overview of a specific element. These elements are then addressed through comparative analysis. The analysis provides for the drafter language found in other peace agreements from which the most relevant to the drafter's conflict can be selected. Each section then concludes with sample language.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Demilitarization is often found as a section of a more comprehensive agreement that addresses multiple security issues, which may include ceasefires, borders, policing, and other operations. The demilitarization section usually includes three processes: decommissioning, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Decommissioning seeks to remove weapons from active use in a conflict and control the presence of weapons in civil society. This process is sometimes called disarmament. Demobilization involves disbanding armed units or withdrawing forces to less combative positions. Reintegration involves providing former combatants with the tools and opportunities necessary to become productive members of post-conflict society. Incorporating DDR language into peace agreements and new constitutions is essential to effective reduction of weapons of war from active service and the reintegration of combatants into civil society.

The comparative analysis of past conflicts and existing DDR agreements demonstrates some common elements incorporated in DDR process. This includes establishing a joint implementation commission, a public education and relations campaign, and an implementation timeline. Also, the analysis of each DDR component provides a comprehensive approach to demilitarization – covering such topics as weapons collection, redeployment of soldiers, and equal opportunities for ex-combatants to reintegrate.

This template includes four sections. The first provides an overview of the basic elements in DDR. The second section takes a deeper look at the main elements individually using comparative analysis and sample language. The third section provides a background summary of other conflicts that required demilitarization provisions. The fourth section lists resources for further research on DDR issues.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

User's Guide	2
Executive Summary	3
Table of Contents	4
Index of Agreements	5
Basic Elements	7
Comparative Analysis	11
Joint Implementation Commission	11
<i>Requests for International Assistance</i>	14
Decommissioning / Disarmament	16
<i>Weapons Collection / Cantonment</i>	16
<i>Weapons Trade-In Program</i>	23
<i>Weapons Registration</i>	25
<i>Multiple Regional Cantonment Sites</i>	27
<i>Amnesty</i>	29
Demobilization	30
<i>Redeployment of Armed Forces</i>	30
<i>Redeployment of Foreign Troops</i>	33
Reintegration	35
<i>Screening Process</i>	35
<i>Equal Opportunities for Incorporation & Training</i>	37
<i>Alternative Reintegration Programs</i>	40
<i>Special Needs: Women, Children, & the Disabled</i>	42
Public Education & Information	45
Implementation Timetable	47
Summary of Key Conflicts and DDR Agreements	49
List of Resources	55

INDEX OF AGREEMENTS

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BASIC ELEMENTS

Demilitarization includes three processes: decommissioning, demobilization, and reintegration. Decommissioning seeks to remove weapons from active use in a conflict and control the presence of weapons in civil society. The process is also sometimes called disarmament. Demobilization involves disbanding armed units or withdrawing forces to less combative positions. Reintegration involves the discharge of soldiers from military service and their reincorporation as productive citizens into civil society. Often, demilitarization will be overseen by a commission established to oversee the cease-fire.

Agreements covering all aspects of DDR often include the basic elements outlined below. Depending on the existence of previous cease-fires or other demilitarization agreements, as well as the nature of the conflict, some elements require revisions to address the unique characteristics of each situation.

Joint Implementation Commission: The majority of DDR agreements establish a joint implementation commission to monitor the agreement's implementation, facilitate open communication, and resolve any disputes.

Requests for International Assistance: Considering the significant amount of money, manpower, and expertise needed to implement a DDR agreement, parties typically call upon the international community for financial and technical support.

Decommissioning / Disarmament: A decommissioning program seeks to physically reduce the number of arms in a conflict. Often a decommissioning program will result in the parties placing weapons under the supervision of a neutral third party so that the weapons cannot be used to reinitiate hostilities.

Weapons Collection / Cantonment: Cantonment is the process by which arms are handed over to a monitoring body for storage in order to reduce the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. Often, an international body heads and oversees the cantonment process according to international standards. Parties may choose to hold weapons in cantonment indefinitely, destroy them, or inspect and reissue them as part of the reintegration process.

Weapons Trade-In Program: While the decommissioning process reduces the number of weapons available to organized combatant forces, a

weapons registration and trade-in program could reduce the number of weapons in the civilian and paramilitary population in general. Weapon trade-in programs offer incentives to encourage citizens to voluntarily hand over their weapons in exchange for money, goods, or services.

Weapons Registration: Alternatively, a weapons registration program allows residents to keep their weapons while enabling the government to track such weapons. Ex-combatants who reintegrate into security or police forces may qualify for return of their weapons.

Multiple Regional Cantonment Sites: Multiple sites in various affected regions help reduce the possibilities for a single site overflowing, centralized crime and violence around one site, and transit risks, such as vehicle accidents or hijackings.

Amnesty: Amnesty provisions assure combatants that the cantonment, trade-in, and/or registration programs will not be used to make arrests, thereby encouraging broad participation. However, those who have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, or acts of genocide are excluded.

Demobilization: Demobilization involves transforming armed units or withdrawing forces to less combative positions. The goal of demobilization activities is to reduce the possibility of a renewal of hostilities.

Redeployment of Armed Forces: Redeployment of armed forces or other bands of fighters (i.e. paramilitaries) to less hostile positions is essential to reducing the threat of resumed hostilities. While disengaging hostilities is important, the reduction of forces in key areas further encourages a permanent peace.

Withdrawal of Foreign Troops: Withdrawal of foreign combat troops is also essential to implement demilitarization. An alternative to complete withdrawal is to restrict foreign troops to their barracks. Reduction of allies of combative parties will lessen the likelihood of resumed violence.

Reintegration: Reintegration involves providing opportunities for ex-combatants to participate in post-conflict societies. Such activities can range from screening and then integrating ex-combatants into the police, armed forces, or

other national service forces to providing them with job training or other economically viable positions.

Screening Process: Screening involves comprehensively investigating ex-combatants to determine their ability to successfully integrate into the police, armed forces, or a potential national guard. Screening assures parties that ex-combatants are both qualified for certain positions and that they have not committed any acts (such as genocide, crimes against humanity, serious violations of human rights etc.) which make them undesirable candidates for integration.

Equal Opportunities for Incorporation & Training: Integration into regular units of security forces, security training, vocational job training, assistance with job placement, and social welfare programs, ensures participation at all levels by representatives from all sides of the conflict, and provides for sustainable long-term reintegration.

Alternative Reintegration Programs: Alternative programs, such as a national protection corps, should be available for ex-combatants ineligible for integration into security forces. Such a corps could perform public service projects, rebuild communities damaged by conflict, and provide valuable services in the case of natural disasters.

Special Needs: Women, Children, & the Disabled: Vulnerable groups require special protections. Among those most vulnerable are women, children, and the disabled who either participated in a conflict or were affected by it. Special needs include reunification with families, educational opportunities, and rehabilitation.

Public Education & Information: Public confidence built through information campaigns creates widespread interest and a greater chance for successful implementation of a DDR program. This is because there is greater public accountability, support and vigilance. A joint public relations campaign educates the public about the activities that all parties are carrying out to achieve demilitarization and can be used to advertise such things as weapons trade-ins, vocational training opportunities, registration and other disarmament programs affecting all citizens.

Implementation Timetable: Because delays threaten the peace process and increase the likelihood of cease-fire breaches, timing is crucial to demilitarization. Some agreements call for implementation in phases, while others simply give a specific deadline for completion. At a minimum, parties should acknowledge the need for establishing a concrete timeline. Otherwise, all sides could continually delay the process.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Joint Implementation Commission

Primary Note: The majority of DDR agreements establish a commission to monitor the implementation of the agreement, facilitate open communication, and resolve any disputes regarding the agreements, their interpretation, implementation or breach. The joint implementation commission often consists of representatives from each party and a neutral mediator. The commission often has two purposes, to serve as a dispute resolution mechanism and to assist with the agreement's implementation.

Note: The Aceh Agreement designates the basic functions of a joint committee that will create and carry out a disarmament process.

Aceh Agreement, Article 3b

The functions of JSC [Joint Security Committee] are: ... (vii) to design and implement a mutually agreed-upon process of demilitarisation... The GOI [Government of Indonesia] has the right to request HDC [Henry Dunant Centre] to undertake no-notice verification of the designated sites.

Note: The Liberia Agreement develops the nature of the joint commission's authority and membership.

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Part Three, Article VI

There shall be an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), to coordinate DDRR activities.

The NCDDRR shall comprise representatives from relevant NTGL Agencies [National Transitional Government of Liberia], the GOL, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, the United Nations, the African Union and the ICGL.

It shall oversee and coordinate the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, working closely with

the ISF [International Stabilisation Force] and all relevant international and Liberian institutions and agencies.

Note: Similar to the Aceh and Liberia agreements, the Burundi Agreement contains several provisions establishing a number of commissions, organs and committees with responsibilities related to the ceasefire and DDR process. These commissions and committees include a ceasefire and reintegration commission and a technical committee. The responsibilities of these bodies include, for instance, verification of military information and monitoring troops and munitions.

Burundi Agreement, Protocol III, Chapter III, Article 27.1.d-e

The Ceasefire Commission shall be responsible, among other things, for:

Establishing the location of units at the time of the ceasefire;

Establishing liaison between the parties for the purpose of the ceasefire;

Finding appropriate solutions in the event of difficulty in disengagement;

Conducting investigations of any ceasefire violations;

Verifying all information, data and activities relating to military forces of the parties;

Verifying the disengagement of the military forces of the parties where they are in direct contact;

Monitoring the storage of arms, munitions equipment;

Monitoring the quartering of troops and police;

Undertaking the disarmament of all illegally armed civilians;

Undertaking mine clearance throughout the country.

The parties undertake to provide the Ceasefire Commission immediately with all relevant information on the organization, equipment and positions of their forces, on the understanding that such information shall be held in strict confidence.

Burundi Agreement, Protocol III, Article 21

An organ to deal with the socio-professional reintegration of demobilized troops shall be established.

A technical committee to work out the programme and modalities of demobilization shall be set up.

The international community shall be requested to assist in the process of demobilization

Following the demobilization process, a certificate shall be issued to demobilized troops.

Each demobilized person shall receive a demobilization allowance.

Burundi Agreement, Protocol V, Article 5.8

Reintegration Commission

The organ provided for in article 21, paragraph 8 of Protocol III to the Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Reintegration Commission shall have the role of organizing, supervising, monitoring and ensuring the effective economic and social reintegration of the troops and combatants who, as a result of the demobilization process carried out in conformity with article 21 of Protocol III to the Agreement, have become civilians.

Sample Language: Joint Implementation Commission

A joint commission shall supervise the DDR programs outlined in this agreement. The joint commission will include representatives of each party and international experts, under the supervision of an international body. The parties shall mutually agree on who will comprise the international experts by [*insert date*].

[Insert impartial mediator] will serve as an impartial mediator and facilitator of commission business. The mediator's role is to ensure that all disputes are resolved within the commission structure and that parties fully disclose all their decommissioning, demobilization, and reintegration activities in accordance with this agreement.

Parties may submit to the joint commission reports regarding information about another party violating the agreement. The accused party shall have the opportunity to respond to accusations in a hearing. The final authority on all implementation matters rests with the commission. Also, to ensure compliance with the terms of this agreement, all sides will be subject to surprise inspections.

Requests for International Assistance

Note: Most effective DDR programs have the financial and logistical support of international actors. Involvement from a neutral international body can help build trust among the parties and adds legitimacy to the efforts. Assistance may come from an international organization (such as the United Nations), a trusted third-party state, or an international non-governmental organization. Because previous successful DDR programs often required large commitments of money and manpower, adequately securing resources from international groups facilitates the implementation of the DDR agreement. Consequently, agreements sometimes call for international assistance to structure, implement, or finance a DDR program

Note: In the Liberia Cotonou Agreement the parties expressly call upon the financial and programmatic assistance of international actors.

Liberia Cotonou Agreement 1993, Section H, Article 9 (1)

Further, the Parties hereby call upon the United Nations, other international organizations and countries, to programme and finance the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life.

Note: In the Burundi Agreement the parties formally recognized the vital role that international actors must play in the DDR process and agreed that the government would immediately solicit international assistance.

Burundi Agreement, Protocol V, Article 7, “Role of the international community”

The involvement of the international community in the implementation of the Agreement is necessary, both as a moral and diplomatic guarantee and as a provider of technical, material and financial assistance.

In this respect, the Burundian Government shall immediately following the signature of the Agreement send formal requests to the countries and organizations agreed upon by the Parties inviting them to participate in and render their financial, technical and material support to the implementation of the Agreement as provided for in the relevant provisions of the present Protocol and of Protocols I, II, III and IV.

Note: Like the Burundi Agreement, the Sierra Leone Agreement also commits the government to immediately request international technical and financial assistance.

Sierra Leone Agreement, Part Four, Article XVI, “Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”

Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA.

Note: Key international agencies that have provided technical and financial support to parties involved in peace processes include:

Catholic Relief Services <http://www.catholicrelief.org/>,
International Organization for Migration <http://www.iom.int/>,
International Labor Organization <http://www.ilo.org/>,

German Technical Co-Operation

<http://www.unep.org/unep/partners/national/germany/gtz/>,

UN Office for Project Service <http://www.unops.org/>.

Sample Language: Requests for International Assistance

Recognizing that DDR programs require significant amounts of money and manpower, parties request the technical, material, and financial assistance of the international community in implementing this agreement. Parties agree upon soliciting support from the following countries and organizations: [*list of organizations*]. Parties shall immediately send formal requests to those listed, inviting them to render their support to the DDR process.

Decommissioning / Disarmament

Primary Note: Decommissioning seeks to remove or regulate the number of arms in active use in a conflict, including the removal of war-making materials (i.e. gunpowder and artillery) from civilian areas. The primary mechanisms involved in decommissioning are: 1) disarmament through weapon collections / cantonment and 2) arms control through weapon registration and trade-in programs. Effective and comprehensive decommissioning is perhaps the most vital aspect of maintaining a ceasefire and establishing a long-term, stable environment.

In previous agreements, the transparency and visibility of DDR programs and activities helped to gain the trust of locals and ex-combatants and discouraged further conflict. The involvement of a neutral external organization in the verification and monitoring of the process also helped to build this trust. Most agreements contained a clear intent to collect weapons from all parties an indicator that the parties were willing to cooperate with the process.

Weapons Collection / Cantonment

Note: Cantonment is the process by which weapons are handed over to a monitoring body for storage in order to reduce the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. Weapons may include guns, ammunition, small arms, light and heavy weapons, unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive

ordnance devices (EODs), landmines, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards (for more information about clearing mines and EODs, see the Cambodia Agreement and the Cease-Fire template).

Note: An international monitoring body often heads weapons collection by confiscating, trading, or buying back weapons, then cataloging, and finally storing the weapons in a secure depot or warehouse according to international standards (see, for example, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs <http://disarmament.un.org/>). Weapons secured in cantonment can be held indefinitely, destroyed, or inspected and reissued as part of the reintegration process.

Note: Most agreements provide that the collection of weapons must be subject to verification. Many treaties do not explicitly mention verification, but instead use the term “monitoring.” Two scenarios exist for collecting weapons:

Run by External Organization: An outside agency (such as the United Nations or a reputable NGO) collects the weapons from all parties. Each party can request inspection of the collected weapons at any time. This dual verification can build confidence in the disarmament process.

Mutual Monitoring: Each party agrees to collect and store its own weapons in a specified location, subject to unannounced verification by a neutral third party (e.g. an external organization) who also monitors the situation.

Note: Except for the Bougainville Agreement, all parties to the following agreements chose the first option by designating an external agency to collect weapons from all parties. Each of the following agreements also makes provisions for the United Nations or a special commission to oversee the disarmament process.

Note: In the Angola Agreement, the parties agreed to UN supervision of the decommissioning process and outlines a role for the National Police and the leaders of the respective troops.

Angola Agreement, Annex 3, Second Phase, Step 4

Step four involves the completion of the quartering of the military forces of UNITA and the collection, storage and custody of their armaments under the supervision and control of the United Nations. It also includes the start of the collection, storage and custody of all the armaments in the hands of civilians by the National Police with verification and monitoring by the United Nations. The operation to collect all the lethal war materiel of UNITA's military forces will be conducted directly by the general staff and the command elements of these troops under United Nations verification, monitoring and control. The United Nations will, as part of a consecutive action, collect this lethal war materiel and will proceed to store and take custody of it as previously agreed. Ammunition and materiel storage locations will be located in separate areas from the quartering locations.

Note: The Liberia Cotonou Agreement also carved out a role for the United Nations.

Liberia Cotonou Agreement, Section E, Article 6, Paragraph 1

All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by ECOMOG [Economic Community of West Africa States Military Observer Group] in armouries designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers.”

Note: The Liberia Comprehensive Agreement also carves out a monitoring role for an international body.

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Part Two, Article 4, Paragraph 3

The Parties request the ISF [International Stabilization Force] to assume the following mandate:

Observe and monitor the ceasefire;

Investigate violations of the security aspects of this Agreement and take necessary measures to ensure compliance.

Monitor disengagement and cantonment of forces of the Parties and provide security at disarmament/cantonment sites;

Collect weapons at disarmament sites and elsewhere and ensure that the weapons so collected are properly accounted for and adequately secured;

Note: The Aceh Agreement provides for a joint security commission (JSC) to supervise the decommissioning.

Aceh Agreement, Article 3b (vii)

... the JSC will designate what will be called Peace Zones (see Art. 4(a)). After peace zones have been identified, the GAM [Free Aceh Movement] will designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of the COH and as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its weapons, arms and ordinance in the designated sites. ...

Note: The Guatemala Cease-Fire Agreement looks to the UN to oversee the disarmament and details what weapons and materials must be turned over.

Guatemala Cease-Fire Agreement, Paragraphs 24-26

Disarming of URNG

Disarming shall consist of the depositing, registration and handing over to the United Nations of all types of offensive and defensive weapons, munitions, explosives, mines and other supplementary military equipment in the possession of URNG forces, whether in their possession or in minefields or clandestine storage anywhere.

Note: The Sierra Leone ECOWAS Agreement sets specific timetables for disarmament and demobilization and establishes ECOWAS as the supervising body.

Sierra Leone ECOWAS Agreement, Paragraph 2

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants. It is considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct effective disarmament and demobilization of combatants. This should take place from 1 to 31 December 1997. Given the nationwide dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and uncomplicated procedure is envisaged. Combatants will be directed to report to designated centres in order to be engaged in the disarmament process. ECOMOG will supervise the entire process of disarmament and demobilization.

Note: The Sierra Leone Agreement below establishes a three month time period for disarmament and demobilization.

Sierra Leone Agreement, Article 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within one month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

Note: The Somalia Agreement establishes a cease-fire monitoring group that will take control of the weaponry until a Somalia governing entity is sufficiently ready and capable of assuming the task. It also establishes a timeline for carrying out the process, and outlines a role for the international community in maintaining encamped militias and providing training for reintegration.

Somalia Agreement, Article 1, “Disarmament”

All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.

The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in

appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.

All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

Note: The Bougainville Agreement envisions a two-stage process of DDR and outlines a leadership role for local chiefs and elders, domestic armed forces, as well as the United Nations.

Bougainville Agreement, Article E

Stage 1

Stage 1 will begin immediately, initially in areas where there is no Defence Force or Police Mobile Unit presence. It will proceed in all areas as follows:

Councils of Chiefs/Elders will inform UNOMB [United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville] when the people in a particular area are ready for ex-combatants to disarm and re-integrate into the community, remaining Defence Force and Police Mobile Units to withdraw, and weapons to be securely contained;

UNOMB will inform the PPCC sub-committee;

The National Government will be advised and take appropriate steps to arrange for Defence Force and Police Mobile Unit personnel to withdraw from that area;

Weapons will be handed in to BRA and BRF unit commanders, who will store them securely in containers provided through the PPCC and sealed for purposes of verification by UNOMB.

Stage 2

After implementation of stage 1 in any area, stage 2 will begin in that area with the delivery of weapons to company commanders, who will place them in secure containers at a small number of central locations.

When and if amendments to the National Constitution to implement the comprehensive agreement are ready for certification, the weapons will be held in containers under UNOMB supervision and secured by two locks with one key held by the relevant commander and the other held by UNOMB pending a final decision on the ultimate fate of the weapons.

The Bills to amend the National Constitution will provide for the constitutional amendments to take effect on verification by UNOMB that the weapons are in secure, double-locked containers under its supervision.

Sample Language: Weapons Collection/ Cantonment

Parties agree that establishing integrated security forces trusted by the local community is a key element to reestablishing peace, security and economic opportunity in [*insert country name*]. To achieve this goal, parties shall engage in a transparent, internationally supervised decommissioning program that will eventually establish integrated security forces.

The weapons collection process shall begin with a withdrawal of some government forces in the region and cantonment of weapons used by paramilitary forces. [*Paramilitary troops*] [*Non-governmental forces*] shall engage in a cantonment process by [*insert date*] whereby arms,

specifically large caches of arms, will be submitted to agreed-upon locations for storage. [*insert independent international body*] shall supervise the cantonment process.

Case 1: Run by External Organization

Parties will provide [*external organization*] with a complete inventory of all weapons within [*insert timeframe, e.g. 15 days after signature of the Agreement*]. Within [*insert timeframe, e.g. 30 days after the Agreement*], the parties will turn over all weapons on those lists to [*external organization*].

Case 2: Mutual Monitoring

Parties will bring weapons to the designated locations for registration. Each party will provide personnel to secure the storage facility. The facility and the weapons inventory will be inspected on a regular basis by [*external organization*].

The following weapons and other materials shall be turned into the secure storage facility. [*Insert list of weapons and other materials*]

As the cantonment process continues, [*insert independent international body or external organization*] shall examine weapons to determine if they can be returned to ex-combatants for use after integration into a security force. All unusable [*and usable*] weapons shall be destroyed.

Weapons Trade-In Program

Note: Few agreements thus far have explicitly provided for trade-in or incentive programs. This is only because often parties did not anticipate the need for such incentives until voluntary surrender of weapons proves ineffective or diminishes sharply. However, explicitly providing for such incentives in the agreements is preferable as it can encourage combatants or civilians to lay down their arms at the beginning of the process. Incentives may include exchanging weapons for food or goods, land, tools for agriculture or construction, loan guarantees, medical care, benefits, or cash. However, such incentives, especially cash, may draw more weapons to

regions offering the program. Therefore, an international agency needs to closely administer a weapons buy-back or trade-in program to ensure that weapons collected do not fall back into the hands of fighting factions or weapons dealers. Moreover, regional cooperation can be a key factor in the success or failure of disarmament, as effective regional agreements can prevent, or slow, the traffic of weapons back into the post-conflict society.

Note: The parties deal with the issue of incentives in different ways. In Liberia, three months after signing the Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, parties offered armed combatants payment in exchange for their weapons. In Mozambique, ex-combatants received medical care and benefits, although the agreement did not initially make this explicit. Rather than exclude the issue from the agreement, the Sierra Leone ECOWAS Agreement specifically calls attention to the possibility of the need for incentives.

Sierra Leone ECOWAS Agreement, Paragraph 2

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants.
... Where necessary, incentives may have to be provided to encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.

Sample Language: Weapons Trade-in Program

Parties agree that a reduction in the number of privately-held weapons will foster greater peace in the region. As such, parties shall implement an incentives program by [*insert date*] to encourage residents to voluntarily exchange their weapons. Considering the local needs of ex-combatants, incentives offered shall include [*economic opportunities, money, household goods, etc.*].

Members of the international monitoring body shall implement the weapons trade-in program. The international monitoring body shall include members of each party to this agreement. It is essential that residents see parties working together to foster faith in the program and the broader goal of decommissioning, demobilization, and reintegration.

Once the international monitoring body collects the weapons from the trade-in program, they shall keep the weapons in cantonment under the provisions outlined [*for ex-combatants*] [*provided in this*

agreement]. *[If no provision provided in agreement, insert provisions for cantonment]*.

Weapons Registration

Note: Weapons registration allows people to retain some of their weapons while allowing the government to track weapons. International peacekeeping and national security forces can therefore keep track of how many weapons are in a region at one time. The simple process of registration requires accurate information collection and sufficient personnel. Registration, however, typically does not require a large amount of equipment, storage, or security. The most effective decommissioning efforts involve cooperation from all parties as well as local communities and take account of the possible legitimacy of light arms within the society. Sometimes weapons registration involves initial collection followed by the return of some weapons to certain individuals.

Note: The Guatemala Citizen Agreement requires the government to enforce the weapons registration system and explicitly provides for verification of the registration by a UN body.

Guatemala Citizen Agreement, Paragraph 34

In accordance with this Act, the Government undertakes to: (a) Enforce the system of registration of weapons in circulation and identification of their owners; (b) Transfer the registers which are currently deposited in the Arms and Munitions Control Department of the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of the Interior, with verification by MINUGUA [United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala], in a process which will be completed by the end of 1997.

Note: The Liberia Cotonou Agreement provides for weapons registration, verification by UN observers, and return of the weapons in due time.

Liberia Cotonou Agreement, Section E, Article 6, Paragraph 1

All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall also report and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after the elections.

Sample Language: Weapons Registration

Parties recognize that continued peace and security in [*insert name*] is contingent on monitoring and controlling the supply of privately-held arms in the region. To this end, parties shall implement a weapons registration program by [*insert date*]. The program will track weapons and restrict caches of weapons or weapons that could be used for purposes greater than personal protection. This does not include weapons under the control of the integrated security forces.

Weapons collected during the cantonment process shall be registered. The owner shall receive a license and a certificate. The registration process shall be completely free of charge and open to the public. [*External organization*] will monitor and verify the weapons registration process. The weapons registration program shall serve as the first step to registering all publicly and privately held weapons in the region. This process shall coincide with the cantonment process. Parties may establish an incentive program, as outlined above, to encourage registration of weapons.

Participation in reintegration programs, outlined below, shall require ex-combatants to produce a certificate of demobilization. Ex-combatants who reintegrate into security forces and require weapons as part of their official duties shall be eligible for return of their weapons, so long as such weapons meet standards for safety and suitability with the respective security force.

Possession of weapons is subject to the laws of [*country*]. Non-combatants must register their weapons with the [*appropriate local authority*]. The authority will then distribute the registers to the parties and the [*external organization*]. The non-registration of

weapons will be deemed an illegal act and will be punished as such in the court system. Possession of any heavy arms or arms identified elsewhere in this agreement as illegal weapons of combat will be punished in the court system. The Joint Implementation Commission shall monitor and hear claims of breach of the agreement by any party.

Multiple Regional Cantonment Sites

Note: Establishing one centralized collection site can lead to a variety of problems in post-conflict situations. Multiple sites help reduce the possibilities for a single site overflowing, thereby reducing the security of the site. Crime and violence often result around centralized sites as opposing parties congregate with arms in hand. Establishing regional sites reduces not only travel time for the ex-combatants but also risks inherent to transporting weapons. Weapons in transit are subject to vehicle accidents, hijacking, or use by civilians.

Note: The El Salvador Agreement specifically references fifteen designated collection sites and provides for the security of the warehouses and supervision by the United Nations.

El Salvador Agreement, Chapter VII, Paragraph 27

In each of the 15 designated locations, all the arms and equipment mentioned above, save for the personal weapons and equipment of combatants present in the place, shall be kept in locked warehouses. Each warehouse shall have two locks, one key to which shall be kept by ONUSAL and the other by the FMLN commander in the place. ONUSAL shall verify the contents of such warehouses periodically to ensure that there has been no change in them.

Note: In the agreement below, multiple sites are contemplated as well as a system of security where access to the warehouses is limited to the UN and URNG officials. The Guatemala Cease Fire also establishes certain deadlines.

Guatemala Cease-Fire Agreement, “Control of armaments”

From D+11 to D+42 in URNG assembly points, weapons, munitions and other military equipment shall be deposited in special warehouses designated by the United Nations; combatants, however, shall keep their personal equipment and weapons as long as they remain in those locations.

Each warehouse shall have two locks; one key shall be held by the United Nations and the other by the URNG official in charge of each encampment. The United Nations shall periodically check the inventory of each warehouse.

Note: The Kosovo Agreement also contemplates several storage sites, establishes a timetable, and outlines a role for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – a NATO-led international force – in the registration and verification process.

Kosovo Agreement, Chapter 7, Article 5

By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR;

By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall store all prohibited weapons (any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives) and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage sites. Other Forces commanders shall confirm completion of weapons storage to COMKFOR no later than K-Day + 30 days;

Sample Language: Multiple Regional Cantonment Sites

Parties recognize that multiple sites located in regions experiencing conflict, rather than one centralized collection site, reduce the possibility of overflow, accidents, hijacked arms shipments, and centralized crime and violence around a single site. Therefore, parties designate [*list of multiple regional locations*] as sites for collection, trade-in, and/or registration of weapons.

The sites shall be registered with and verified by [*external organization*]. Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure the security of each site, including providing locks and personnel. The Joint Commission will monitor the sites and verify their processes.

Amnesty

Note: An amnesty program instills trust between the parties and ensures that ex-combatants have eligibility to play a productive role in the post-conflict dispensation. In the context of decommissioning, amnesty provisions commonly contain measures to assure combatants that the cantonment, trade-in, and/or registration programs will not be used to make arrests. For these reasons, the key language typically provides amnesty for crimes excluding crimes against humanity, war crimes, acts of genocide, or serious violations of human rights. These amnesties often help to encourage broad participation from ex-combatants. For more information on amnesty, see the Ceasefire Handbook.

Note: The Burundi Agreement provides amnesty to combatants with certain exclusions.

Burundi Agreement, Chapter III, Article 26

Amnesty shall be granted to all combatants of the political parties and movements for crimes committed as a result of their involvement in the conflict, but not for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or for their participation in *coups d'état*.

Sample Language: Amnesty

In order to instill confidence and foster participation in cantonment, trade-in, and registration processes, an amnesty program for ex-combatants shall be implemented to ensure that these processes are not linked to arrests. Parties agree to grant general amnesty to all combatants for crimes committed as a result of their involvement in the conflict. [*but not for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, serious violations of human rights, or for their participation in coups d'état*] In addition, residents [*including ex-*

combatants] shall be given a guarantee of anonymity for their participation.

Demobilization

Primary Note: Demobilization involves disbanding armed units or withdrawing forces to less combative positions. This process further involves removing foreign troops from the theatre of conflict. Demobilization aims to remove or eliminate the possibility of a renewal of hostilities. Timing is key to effective demobilization. Programs must start quickly considering that former combatants, with high levels of expectation and combat skills, can pose a major threat to the implementation of the peace agreement. As time passes, demobilization becomes more difficult. Also, effective demobilization must take into account the social environment and special needs of the population.

Note: Generally, successful demobilizations include: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Uganda. The timing of the demobilization played a key role in these successes. In each, demobilization occurred after only a limited risk of reengaging in conflict remained. Furthermore, the programs were local and community-based. In Uganda, veterans organized the demobilization program. Nicaragua and El Salvador represent successful attempts at demobilization as per the troops and ammunitions components of the agreement. However, demobilization in Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan was less successful because of the complex and unstable political environment.

Redeployment of Armed Forces

Note: Withdrawing troops to less-combative positions diminishes the influence of the military and creates a more secure environment. A smaller, less influential army is less likely to disrupt a nascent peace process. Because so many conflicts currently are civil, or separatist, in nature, parties need to consider the composition of the country, or region within the country, when determining which combatants to demobilize and which to keep in the military.

Note: The Mozambique Agreement broadly defines demobilization.

Mozambique Agreement, Protocol IV, Article VI, i, 1

Demobilization...means the process whereby, at the decision of the respective parties, soldiers who on E-Day were members of those forces, revert for all purposes to the status of civilians.

Note: The Burundi Agreement specifically lists “categories of people to be demobilized” and specifically calls for international assistance.

Burundi Agreement, Protocol III, Article 21: Demobilization

Demobilization shall begin after the signature of the Agreement in accordance with the implementation timetable (see Annex V).

To move from war to peace requires demobilization within the defence and security forces as well as for the combatants of the political parties and movements.

Demobilization shall involve both the members of the Burundian armed forces and the combatants of the political parties and movements.

Lists of people to be demobilized shall be compiled.

Members to be demobilized shall be provided with some form of appropriate identification.

Demobilization criteria and a demobilization package shall be drawn up.

The categories of people to be demobilized shall be:

Volunteers;

Those members who are handicapped or disabled;

Those who do not meet the age criteria;

Those whose discipline is such that they cannot be retained within the new defence and security forces;

Individuals whose educational level is such that they would not be able to undergo military or police training;

Members of the Burundian armed forces and combatants of the political parties and movements who will be rationalized to yield efficient and affordable defence and security forces.

An organ to deal with the socio-professional reintegration of demobilized troops shall be established.

A technical committee to work out the programme and modalities of demobilization shall be set up.

The international community shall be requested to assist in the process of demobilization.

Following the demobilization process, a certificate shall be issued to demobilized troops.

Each demobilized person shall receive a demobilization allowance.

Sample Language: Redeployment of Armed Forces

To build confidence in the process of demobilizing and decommissioning, [*insert number*] of government troops shall be withdrawn from the region or withdrawn to positions in outlying areas by [*insert date*]. Troops shall not remain in a position where they can immediately impact the other party's implementation of the terms of this agreement. However, troops shall be maintained in as limited number as possible in order to maintain peace and security in the area.

In addition, non-government troops shall withdraw from any hostile positions. [*Insert percentage*] of non-government troops shall be confined to barracks by [*insert date*] while this agreement is implemented. The remaining combatants may remain on patrol only to maintain law and order in conjunction with any government troops seeking the same goal. Non-government troops confined to the barracks area shall not leave armed.

Redeployment of Foreign Troops

Note: As with decommissioning, the demobilization process faces extreme difficulties if it lacks the cooperation of other countries in the region. Demobilization efforts are aided when domestic demobilization was merely one component of a much larger regional/international demobilization attempt. Some notable characteristics of an effective regional structure are the transparency between countries and a clear framework for regional security. A regional plan may help clarify the role of the international community. In this section, foreign troops refers to combatants, such as mercenaries or combat troops of another country, and is not meant to imply sanctioned peacekeeping forces in place from a supervisory commission such as the UN.

Note: The agreement from Sierra Leone calls for immediate removal of foreign soldiers to be supervised by a Joint Monitoring Commission.

Sierra Leone Agreement, Article XVIII

All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

Note: The Cambodia Agreement clarifies that withdrawal of foreign forces includes all of their ancillary advisors and personnel as well as their weaponry. It also provides for verification by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and authorizes military escorts and border controls to ensure that such forces do not return.

Cambodia Agreement, Section IV, Article 8

Immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement, any foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together with their weapons, ammunition, and equipment, shall be withdrawn from Cambodia and not be returned. Such withdrawal and non-return will be subject to UNTAC verification in accordance with annex 2.

Cambodia Agreement, Annex 2, Article 6, Part 3

Upon confirmation of the presence of any foreign forces, UNTAC will immediately deploy military personnel with the foreign forces and accompany them until they have withdrawn from Cambodian territory. UNTAC will also establish checkpoints on withdrawal routes, border crossing points and airfields to verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return of all categories of foreign forces.

Note: The Mozambique agreement specifically mentions negotiating with concerned countries to ensure complete withdrawal.

Mozambique Agreement, Protocol IV, Article II, 1

The withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory shall be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. The government of the Republic of Mozambique undertakes to negotiate the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from Mozambican territory with the Governments of the countries concerned.

Sample Language: Redeployment of Foreign Troops

Parties call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within this country. Any foreign troops remaining in the country beyond [*insert deadline, e.g. 30 days*] after the signing of this agreement shall be subject to prosecution. Parties request the aid of the neighboring nations in redeploying or removing any of their nationals from this country.

The Joint Commission will supervise this process and establish checkpoints on withdrawal routes, border crossing points and airfields to verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return of all categories of foreign forces. [*Further monitoring and verification will be conducted by (insert name of external force)*]

Reintegration

Primary Note: Reintegration involves the discharge of soldiers from military service, the withdrawal of all other combatants from armed conflict, and their re-incorporation into civilian society by providing them with a stable work environment, adequate compensation, job placement, vocational training, and services to address their special needs.

Experience has shown that peace is most at risk when ex-combatants lack viable opportunities after a conflict. Opportunities for ex-combatants to participate in a post-conflict dispensation can range from vetting duties and integration into the police, armed forces, or national service forces to providing them with job training, placement, or other economically viable positions.

The reintegration process also considers the special needs of former combatants (such as women, child soldiers, or the disabled). Lastly, the reintegration provisions also provide set timetables. Delays in training, deployment of integrated security forces, or assigning of civilian positions compromise the success of a DDR program. Overall, these reintegration provisions ensure broader participation by the all parties in the peace agreement and post-conflict society and in doing so, lead to greater national security.

Screening Process

Note: Screening, or vetting, involves a comprehensive investigation of individual ex-combatants to determine their ability to be successfully integrated into the police, armed forces, or a potential national guard. Many ex-combatants hold valuable training and skills which can be useful as part of a joint, integrated security force. Such training, coupled with the trust placed in many ex-combatants by local citizens, makes them essential elements of joint security forces. Before parties may implement reintegration, they must have assurance that ex-combatants are both qualified for certain positions and that they have not committed any acts which make them undesirable candidates for integration. The screening process provides such assurance. The investigation may include screening for war crimes and crimes against humanity, psychological fitness, and compatibility for the particular program. Often a screening process is conducted by a joint commission ensuring that mutually agreed-upon candidates are incorporated into the security forces, while individuals with high risk factors are not included.

Note: The Liberia Comprehensive Agreement explicitly mentions what will be screened for in the search for qualified candidates to constitute its restructure armed forces,

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Part Four, Article VII (2)

The following Principles shall be taken into account in the formation of the restructured Liberian Armed Forces:

Incoming service personnel shall be screened with respect to educational, professional, medical and fitness qualifications as well as prior history with regard to human rights abuses.

Note: The Guatemala Agreement provides that those guilty of a criminal acts will not be eligible for reintegration.

Guatemala Civilian Agreement, Paragraph 65

The Government undertakes to design and implement, after the signing of the agreement on a firm and lasting peace, programmes to promote the productive reintegration of those members of the armed forces who may be demobilized as a result of this Agreement, with the exception of those found guilty of committing a criminal act. These programmes shall end within one year. The Government shall ensure that these plans receive the necessary funding.

Sample Language: Screening Process

To encourage the demobilization of the region and ensure stability, it is vital that parties provide economic opportunities for ex-combatants to ensure that they are offered alternatives to armed conflict. This agreement recognizes that there are ex-combatants with a wide range of skills, some of which will be useful to security forces.

Representatives from parties and international representatives shall form a special committee of the Joint Implementation Commission by [*insert date*]. The Special Committee on Reintegration will monitor

the reintegration process and serve as a forum for any difficulties which may arise during implementation. [*The committee will operate with transparency and inform the public of its activities.*] Civil society organizations may also play a role in monitoring the process.

Parties shall implement a comprehensive screening process to determine each individual ex-combatant's suitability for reintegration into the official security structure. The screening process shall be supervised by the Joint Implementation Commission and should ensure that ex-combatants with special military or policing skills, who meet all other established criteria, are given positions commensurate with their abilities. Once screened, ex-combatants shall be incorporated into regular duty at predetermined intervals and guaranteed adequate training, compensation and equipment. In addition, both parties shall ensure that security forces incorporate ex-combatants at sufficiently high levels to ensure integration throughout the hierarchy.

Equal Opportunities for Incorporation & Training

Note: Parties, as representatives of the joint implementation commission, typically agree that ex-combatants accepted into the security forces are offered training equal to regular members of the security forces. Ex-combatants are to be integrated into regular units of security forces to ensure participation at all levels. In addition, ex-combatants are usually assured of representation in the regional security structure hierarchy. Often, the joint implementation commission also negotiates terms which would allow ex-combatant commanders to play a role at high levels of the security forces. This would allow for representation in decisions relating to planning and deployment of troops in the region. It is common for the parties to also agree that all ex-combatants shall enjoy equality in opportunities for vocational training, job placement, and other services addressing their special needs.

Note: The Mozambique Agreements addresses the issue of treating with equality all the parties' ex-combatants.

Mozambique Agreement, Protocol IV, Article VI, ii, 1

[f]or all purposes, demobilized soldiers of both parties shall become civilians and shall be accorded equal treatment by the State

Note: The Guatemala URNG Agreement sets a clear timetable for demobilization and reintegration efforts and addresses issues such as emergency assistance, vocational training and employment programs, as well as the identification of specific social and economic programs that may be needed to ensure successful reintegration. The provision ensures that the ex-combatants will be treated on equal terms as other non-combatants otherwise eligible for these programs.

Guatemala URNG Agreement, Article I.3.a

There shall be two separate procedures during the initial integration phase, which shall be applied according to the status of the URNG members concerned: ...

The demobilization stage, which shall last two months and means the ending of URNG military structures at the agreed assembly points. This stage shall include services such as the provision of temporary documentation and vocational training and guidance, with a view to facilitating the subsequent integration of demobilized combatants. The verification authority shall transmit to the Special Integration Commission a definitive list of demobilized combatants drawn up at assembly points no later than D+30;

The reinsertion stage, which shall begin upon completion of the demobilization process (D+60) and end one year later. Its basic purpose is to provide emergency assistance to former combatants and create conditions conducive to a smooth transition to the definitive integration phase. The minimum requirements to be met during such phase are (but shall not be limited to):

Provision of inputs and services appropriate to an emergency situation;

Beginning of training and employment programmes;

Establishment of financial machinery to obtain the resources needed to launch the definitive integration phase;

Identification of government social and economic programmes for the population as a whole that can provide assistance to former combatants and to members of URNG internal structures who are to be integrated during the definitive integration phase, on terms similar to those for other beneficiaries of such programmes.

Note: The Angola Agreement calls for a “process of selection” to determine which forces will be reincorporated into the new armed forces and those that would receive professional training.

Angola Agreement, Annex 4, Article II

After the process of selection of UNITA military forces, the selected personnel will be incorporated in FAA, under the supervision of the General Staff of FAA in which the Generals of UNITA will have already been present.

For administrative and logistic reasons, the excess personnel will be dependent on the above-mentioned General Staff for their professional training, demobilization and reintegration into civilian society.

Note: The El Salvador Agreement addresses assistance with reintegration in not only reintegration into security services, but also with job placement and access to social programs.

El Salvador Agreement, Chapter 5, Paragraph 9

In particular, in the context of the corresponding national programmes, measures shall be taken to facilitate the reintegration of FMLN into the country's civil, institutional and political life, including fellowship, employment and pension programmes, housing programmes and programmes for starting up new businesses.

Sample Language: Equal Opportunities for Incorporation & Training

Parties shall incorporate qualified candidates into the police force by [insert date]. This agreement recognizes that residents of [insert country] need a trusted police force comprised of professional police officers from both parties. Ex-combatants who have experience as police or show an ability to complete the necessary training shall be incorporated into the police force. Parties agree to integrate a minimum of [insert quote number] ex-combatants into the police force.

Parties shall incorporate qualified candidates into the army and other security forces by [insert date]. Ex-combatants who have military training or show an ability to complete the necessary training shall be incorporated into the army or security forces. Parties agree to integrate a minimum of [insert quote number] ex-combatants into the army and other security forces.

All security forces shall establish concrete timelines for the selection and training of ex-combatants. After the vetting process, parties shall place ex-combatants on the same timetable as other security force members. Parties shall also make training available within [insert time period – e.g. 30 days]. Each new security force member shall be provided with the proper equipment, including arms, once they have successfully completed the training course. In addition, new security force members shall be deployed to their unit in a timeframe identical to other security force members. The special committee on reintegration shall monitor this process carefully and serve as a forum for resolving any disputes.

In addition, ex-combatants shall have equal access to vocational training programs, assistance with job placement, and social welfare programs as ordinary civilians.

Alternative Reintegration Programs

Note: Alternative programs are often available for ex-combatants who are not eligible for integration into security forces. One option is to institute a national protection corps which could perform public service projects,

rebuild communities devastated by conflict, and provide valuable manpower in the case of natural disasters. In the most comprehensive and effective agreements, the parties explore other innovative civilian options and job-training programs

Note: The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) offers a valuable example of a post-conflict DDR program not focused solely on security. After the conflict, Kosovo established the KPC to provide ex-combatants with job opportunities and to assist in the reconstruction of the region by re-building and/or rehabilitating areas ravaged by the conflict. Parties to the Peace Agreement saw the KPC as the best option for a Kosovar Albanian population which was reluctant to have its liberation army returned to civilian life.

Note: While security remained a major concern of both parties, the region needed a proper institutional structure to ensure that the local communities could receive assistance in rebuilding devastated areas. The KPC also provided valuable job opportunities and represented the spirit of the peace accord that included a focus on development. The KPC's duties involve assisting in rebuilding bombed or damaged hospitals, guaranteeing that roads are clear and useable, and helping to rebuild villages destroyed in the fighting. Key excerpts of the Kosovo KPC Resolution are provided below detail the organization and composition of the Corp.

Kosovo KPC Resolution, Section 2, "Organization of the Kosovo Corps"

The Kosovo Corps shall consist of active members, up to a maximum of three thousand, as well as reserve members, up to a maximum of two thousand, who may be called upon when required.

Members of the Kosovo Corps shall be individually recruited on the basis of professional criteria required for the functions to be performed. In keeping with the multi-ethnic character of the Kosovo Corps, at least ten percent of both active and reserve members shall comprise individuals from minority groups.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall have final authority over the selection and appointment of members of the Kosovo Corps and shall have the authority to dismiss such members on appropriate grounds.

The Kosovo Corps shall not take part in any political activity, nor shall members of the Kosovo Corps hold public office or actively engage in political affairs.

Sample Language: Alternative Reintegration Programs

Parties shall incorporate qualified candidates into a national protection corps by [insert date]. Ex-combatants who may not have the necessary skills or who are vetted and deemed not appropriate for other security duty, may be incorporated into a national protection corps. The corps shall serve as an unarmed unit with responsibility for rapid disaster response situations, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure development. Its primary responsibility will be to reverse the effects of armed conflict in the community. Parties agree that such a corps will be roughly representational of the various ethnic and religious groups that comprise [insert country name].

Special Needs of Women, Children, and the Disabled

Note: Successful implementation, demobilization and reintegration processes often incorporate the special needs of former combatants (such as women, child soldiers, or the disabled or handicapped). The following sections briefly outline some of these special needs and offer sample language to address vulnerable groups.

Women

Note: Women ex-combatants often face different reintegration challenges than men. Women invariably play multiple functions – as combatants (recruited voluntarily or through coercion and abduction), as spouses/dependants, forced wives, and domestic support. Additionally, women often are the victims of sexual abuse and violence during conflict. Understanding of women’s special circumstances and needs helps to ensure that women receive appropriate assistance. Community-level reintegration programs addressing women’s needs may include health and medical services, basic education, skills and personal development training, trauma

counseling, start-up grants, micro-credit schemes, and reunification with families in the case of abduction or forced separation.

Children

Note: Reinforcing demobilization of child soldiers requires concerted initiatives to place children under the care of their respective families, as well as the provision of an alternative support system for these families. The crux of social and economic reintegration of children involves family reunification – carried out through comprehensive family tracing programs – along with the efforts to ensure their access to health services, formal and basic education, and skills training opportunities. Programs specific to the needs of girl soldiers are also necessary. Conflicts in Cambodia, Uganda, El Salvador, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan have drawn international attention to the use of child soldiers.

Disabled or Handicapped Persons

Note: Programs to facilitate reintegration of disabled ex-combatants may include medical attention, rehabilitation using artificial limbs, and special skills training. Helping disabled ex-combatants regain some physical capabilities enables them to carry out economic and social activities. Disabled ex-combatants may also have needs for psychosocial counselling or referral services to help disabled ex-combatants come to terms with their handicap.

Note: Specifically including measures addressing the special needs of former combatants requires assessment of the group's particular circumstances. The Sierra Leone Agreement addressed one of the region's biggest concerns – child soldiers.

Sierra Leone Agreement, Part Five, Article XXX: Child Combatants

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to

address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

Note: In Liberia, many women and children fought in the civil war, which left many disabled. As a result, its agreement addresses needs more broadly under the heading of “vulnerable groups.”

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Part Nine, Article XXXI

Vulnerable Groups

The NTGL [National Transitional Government of Liberia] shall accord particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Liberia, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Liberia.

With the support of the International Community, the NTGL shall design and implement a program for the rehabilitation of such war victims.

The NTGL shall, in addition, accord special attention to the issue of child combatants.

It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address their special demobilization and re-integration needs.

The NTGL, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.

Sample Language: Special Needs of Women, Children, and the Disabled

Parties shall accord particular attention to the issue of the decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable groups or war victims, including but not limited to women, children, the disabled, and the elderly, who have been severely affected by the conflict. With the support of the international community, parties shall develop programs and mobilize resources that address the specific needs of such vulnerable groups.

Note: For more information on these issues see the list of resources found at the end of this chapter.

Public Education & Information

Primary Note: Public education is central to any DDR program. Public confidence built through increased government transparency and public information campaigns often creates widespread interest and encourages success because of wider public participation and accountability. Often, each side educates its own troops on the specific details of the program in order to avoid misconceptions. A joint public relations campaign then educates the wider public about the activities of both sides and advertises such things as weapons trade-ins or registration programs as well as opportunities for reintegration (i.e. job placement, training, special services). Determining the appropriate methods for informing the public depends on the availability of media outlets (such as TV, radio, or newspapers).

Note: In Bougainville, public education enhanced public accountability and encouraged participation in the process. The Bougainville Agreement, see below, simply called for “an active joint programme.” Following this, Bougainville DDR monitors held public meetings in villages, where they read the peace agreement and DDR provisions, and distributed print material on the state of the DDR process. They also organized sports and cultural activities to create forums where general communication can take place between the monitoring forces and community members.

Bougainville Agreement, Section E, Article 329, Paragraph 4

The sub-committee will seek support for, and co-ordinate:

an active joint programme to promote public awareness, understanding and support of weapons disposal.

Note: The Liberia Comprehensive Agreement also calls for the transitional government's commencement of a community information and education in which it will use any available form of media and calls upon all the parties to create information and education programs.

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Section H, Article 9

... the Liberia National Transitional Government, in collaboration with the parties, shall immediately commence a community information or educational programme, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization. Such programme shall include other social institutions.

Liberia Comprehensive Agreement, Part 4, Article VII, Paragraph 3

All Parties together shall organise Information, Education and Communication (IEC) programs to sensitise the Liberian public as to the mission and activities of the restructuring plan.

Sample Language: Public Education & Information

To enhance public accountability and encourage participation in the peace process, parties shall develop means for educating and informing the public. Parties are responsible for educating their own combatants about the specific details of the DDR program. Parties shall also participate in a joint public relations campaign to promote public awareness and understanding of the peace agreement and DDR process.

The Joint Implementation Committee shall oversee the processes used for educating the public and providing information. The committee

shall also have the responsibility of issuing and disseminating regular reports to the public through the available mass media.

Implementation Timetable

Primary Note: Depending on the complexity of the conflict, the length of time needed for DDR can vary from a few months to many years. A DDR timetable is generally included in a peace accord to ensure parties' due diligence in carrying out and complying with the established process, even though serious delays often push back the agreed-upon dates. While parties may not come to an agreement over the specific dates to implement certain DDR components by the time of signing, at a minimum parties usually specify in the agreement the need to establish a concrete timeline within a specific period after the conclusion of the accord.

Note: Phased demobilization may increase efficiency, as those implementing the agreement can learn from their mistakes early in the process and make necessary adjustments. The Aceh Agreement acknowledges that the DDR process is one of different phases and provides that the process will be completed in five months.

Aceh Agreement, Article 3b

With the growth in confidence of both parties in the process the phased placement of GAM [Free Aceh Movement] weapons will be completed within a period of five months.

Note: The Kosovo Agreement details and sets deadlines for various stages of the procedure and mandates that the Commander of KFOR will establish these procedures.

Kosovo Agreement, Chapter 7, Article 5

COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization and monitoring of Other Forces in Kosovo and for the further regulation of their activities. These procedures will be established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program as follows:

By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR;

By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall store all prohibited weapons (any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives) and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage sites. Other Forces commanders shall confirm completion of weapons storage to COMKFOR no later than K-Day + 30 days;

By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing military uniforms and insignia, and cease carrying prohibited weapons and automatic weapons;

By K-Day + 90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass to the KFOR. After this date, it shall be illegal for Other Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons, and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR;

By K-Day + 120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces shall be completed.

Note: For similar examples, see Mozambique Agreement and Implementation Timetable for the Liberia Comprehensive Agreement available at:

http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_an3.html

Sample Language: Implementation Timetable

The parties recognize that timing is important to the decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration process and that delay threaten the peace process. Therefore, within [insert timeline, e.g. 30] days of the signing of this agreement, parties shall establish a timeline to implement all DDR provisions articulated herein. The Joint Implementation Committee holds the responsibility of monitoring parties' progress towards meeting deadlines.

SUMMARY OF KEY CONFLICTS AND DDR AGREEMENTS

Acheh (Indonesia)

Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945. At that time, Acheh, an oil rich province in northern Sumatra, became part of Indonesia. From 1953, the Achehnese began protesting against central policy in Jakarta and requesting autonomy. In the 1970s, the Indonesian government repressed this movement through military force. After a resurgence of separatist activity, the Indonesian government put Acheh under operational military status in 1991. The force used resulted in many human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, rapes, torture, and forced displacement.

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Acheh Movement (GAM) engaged in dialogue starting in January 2000. In May 2002, the GOI and GAM issued a Joint Statement, resulting in the December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The pact provided for internationally monitored demilitarization. When GAM refused to compromise on its demand for independence, the Indonesian military began to undermine the agreement by encouraging demonstrations against the international monitors and making preparations for a renewed military campaign. GAM rejected the Indonesian government's final ultimatum in Tokyo in May 2003. This resulted in the imposition of martial law in Acheh. In May 2004, a presidential decree downgraded the province from a "state of danger" to a "civil emergency."

Angola

Since independence from Portugal in 1975, the Angolan people have suffered from ongoing wars, power struggles, and security problems, resulting in up to 1.5 million deaths. The Angolan government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a peace accord in 1994. A national unity government was installed in April 1997, but serious fighting resumed in late 1998, rendering hundreds of thousands of people homeless.

The 1994 Angola Agreement provided for the integration of former UNITA insurgents into the government, armed forces, and police force, as well as established a rapid reaction force. The joint military force was proportional to the total number of government forces and rebel forces. Ex-combatants in excess of the established quotas were eligible for reintegration training programs, including reintegration into the police force. The rapid reaction force monitored spontaneous

acts of violence but had an extremely limited mandate to intervene in violent situations or engage in an extended deployment. A UN monitoring team oversaw the process and worked with both parties to establish the size of the force, selection criteria, supervision of training, vocational training, placement of forces, logistics, and administrative resources. The UN began the reintegration program only after all UNITA combatants were confined to barracks.

Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)

When Papua New Guinea gained independence in 1975, Bougainville was a somewhat reluctant part of the new nation, in large part due to suspicions of outside prospectors who exploited Bougainville's copper mines. Disputes over compensation for land use fueled the violence that erupted in January 1989. Nine years later, the secessionist revolt ended after claiming some 20,000 lives.

The 1997 Bougainville Peace Agreement called for (1) the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force on Bougainville and (2) a cease-fire, demilitarization, and disarmament upon the arrival of this force. Representatives from all parties and members of the UN Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) comprised a sub-committee responsible for all aspects of the implementation of the DDR plan. A public relations campaign informed the public of the terms of the agreement.

Weapons were handed from combatants to rebel commanders, who stored them in accordance with the agreement. In exchange for not reissuing weapons to ex-combatants, the government promised not to redeploy soldiers withdrawn from conflict areas. The first weapons disposal ceremony was held in December 2001. By July 2003, over 1900 weapons had been registered, with more than 90 per cent of them contained under UN supervision. In December 2003, parties agreed to destroy the weapons as the final outcome of the weapons disposal process. By late June 2004, around 85 percent of the registered weapons had been destroyed.

Burundi

Since 1993, Burundi has been engaged in a civil war. The hostilities between ethnic Hutu & Tutsi factions in Burundi left mass destruction, including tens of thousands of deaths and over 2 million refugees. The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement sought to establish peace in Burundi between these two groups. However, the parties failed to meet the conditions of the agreement, including reform of the military, demobilization, and reintegration of refugees, internally displaced people, and ex-combatants. Several subsequent attempts at

peace also failed. In 2003, a power-sharing agreement brokered by South Africa provided the best chance for what is now a tentative peace. Yet the country's stability was again threatened in August 2004, when 160 Congolese Tutsis in a Burundian refugee camp were massacred by Burundian Hutus.

The Burundi Agreement called for demobilization of certain categories of combatants in order to leave a professional military force in place. Those asked to disarm included volunteer combatants as well as those who did not meet the minimum age criteria, had a record of poor discipline, or insufficient education to successfully complete military training. In exchange, ex-combatants received a monetary "demobilization allowance." In addition, amnesty was granted to all combatants, except those accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. The Agreement also established a Cease-Fire Commission, composed of all parties, the Organization of African Unity, the UN, and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi. The commission established the location of military units and liaisons between parties, investigated violations, verified progress, monitored storage of arms and quartering of soldiers, and disarmed civilians.

El Salvador

A 12-year civil war, which resulted in 75,000 deaths, came to a close in 1992, when the government and leftist rebels signed a treaty that provided for military and political reforms. However, unemployment, poverty, disgruntled ex-combatants, and a proliferation of guns in the country has led to high homicide rates in El Salvador.

The DDR agreement mandated that the rebels first provide the government with a list of all weapons and their locations. The government then moved the arms to designated storage sites, although rebels were allowed to keep their weapons as long as they remained quartered in their barracks. When the ex-combatants left the barracks for reintegration, they had to place their weapons in cantonment.

Guatemala

For thirty-six years, the government of Guatemala and guerilla groups engaged in a civil war. In the 1980s, four guerilla groups merged to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). After years of peace talks, fighting ceased in 1996. By December of 1996, the UN brokered a final peace treaty.

The terms of the agreement included a one-third cut in the size of the army, the laying down of arms by guerillas, and the reincorporation of URNG fighters to a civilian life. Because the fighting ended before the signing of the final accord, the cessation of armed conflict was not a significant challenge in Guatemala. Many factors led to the success of lasting peace, including the lack of violations of the agreement, the role of the United Nations in encouraging the parties to fulfill the agreement, the weakness of the URNG, and the internal acceptance by Guatemalan civil society who perceived the peace process as a beneficial development.

Kosovo

In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia began to unravel along ethnic lines. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia all declared their independence in 1991, while Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit in 1992. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in 1992, and Serbia led various military intervention efforts to unite Serbs in neighboring republics into a "Greater Serbia". All of these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. In 1999, Serbs led a massive campaign to expel ethnic Albanians living in the autonomous republic of Kosovo. This provoked an international response, including the NATO bombing of Serbia and the stationing of NATO and Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo.

A peace agreement was signed in February 1999. Weapons were placed in mutually agreed-upon weapons storage sites. In time, combatants were prohibited from wearing any military clothing or carrying prohibited weapons. Responsibility for the weapons was eventually transferred to international control and all non-local ex-combatants were ordered to leave the region. As a result of bargaining, the international community and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army established the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in an effort to help demobilize the army.

Liberia

Civil war broke out in Liberia in 1990, following a coup that overthrew the government. The war resulted in 100,000 to 150,000 casualties and some 700,000 refugees. Three major political groups vied for power. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) administered a number of peace accords with UN support, including the 1993 Cotonou Agreement and the 1995 Abuja Peace Accord. However, these agreements failed to bring lasting peace as fighting

continued. An amended 1996 Abuja Accord called for peace through a cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization, followed by elections. An election took place the following year despite serious cease-fire violations and incomplete disarmament. The newly elected president was never able to fully eliminate rebel groups that sought to oust him by force and resigned in August 2003. Thereafter, a transitional government – composed of rebel, government, and civil society groups – assumed control.

In December 2003, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began its disarmament program, which called for all weapons to be inventoried and taken to storage facilities. Armed combatants could exchange their weapons for payment. Non-combatants also had to hand over their weapons, which may be returned to them after proper registration. A national public relations campaign explained the program and urged participation. While the frequency of armed clashes between factions has dropped steeply since the end of the 2003 conflict, low-intensity fighting between various armed factions remains an unpredictable threat to stability.

Mozambique

After proclaiming independence from Portugal in 1975, a 17-year civil war ensued with two political groups vying for power. Further complicating the situation, both groups had outside ties and alliances. FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) had links with the former USSR and East Germany and followed a Marxist ideology. RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) had links with Rhodesia and later backing from South Africa. A UN-negotiated peace agreement with rebel forces ended the fighting in 1992.

The UN presided over a cease-fire commission, which oversaw all aspects of the DDR program. The program required ex-combatants to register for a demobilization certificate and receive an ID card. The ex-combatants were then eligible for medical care and other benefits. Reintegration assistance was available only to those who could produce ID cards and demobilization certificates. A Reintegration Commission oversaw this process.

Sierra Leone

For a decade, Sierra Leone engaged in a bloody civil war, leaving some 50,000 dead amidst a plight of human rights atrocities. The attempted peace of 1999 broke apart when efforts to disarm the rebels initially proved too unstable.

UN peacekeeping troops and a contingent of British paratroopers then helped establish a degree of stability. Parties agreed to a DDR program in concert with a comprehensive cease-fire and peace agreement.

In May 2001, approximately 17,500 UN observers were on hand to assist in the DDR process. The war officially ended in February 2002, followed by peaceful elections in May 2002. By February 2004, the UN forces finished their five-year plan for disarming approximately 70,000 combatants. Some 21,000 ex-combatants are participating in reintegration programs. However, a fragile peace remains under the watch of the UN.

LIST OF RESOURCES

Websites for Information on DDR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

<http://www.unidir.org/>

Peace and Security through Disarmament, United Nations Disarmament Commission (under the Security Council). <http://disarmament.un.org>

UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center. Reintegration & Rehabilitation Unit, Emergency Response Division. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/ddr/>

NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. <http://disarm.igc.org/>

Organizations that Give Technical Assistance in Demobilization

United Nations Development Program.

<http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/index.htm>

Bonn International Center for Conversion (non-profit organization).

<http://www.bicc.de/demobil/index.html>

Creative Associates International, Inc (for-profit organization). <http://www.caii-dc.com/CIT/default.htm>

Articles on General DDR Issues

Lessons Learned Unit, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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Massimo Fusato, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project / Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado.

<http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/demobilization.jsp>

Nat J. Colletta & Doug Pearce, *The World Bank, Demobilization, and Social Reconstruction*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1 January 2001. <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/light/14.pdf>

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Case Studies

“Examples of Good Practice: Spotlight on Selected Projects,” Global Information Networks in Education, <http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/examples.html>

Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, & Ingo Wiederhofer, “Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda,” World Bank, 1 January 1996. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/06/01/000009265_3961214183011/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

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Suzanne Heigh, Sarah Keener, & Luiz Pereira da Silva, “Best Practice in War-to-Peace Transition: The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program,” Africa Regional Series, World Bank, 1 January 1993. <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/infobeng/infob12e.htm>

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Series, World Bank, 1 October 2002.

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Gerald Mazarire & Martin R. Rupiya, “Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000,” *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Centre for Defense Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000.

<http://www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds/journals/volume1/number1/article5.html>

Denise Spencer, “Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America,” Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1 February 2001.

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Sandra J. Ayoo & John J. Oloya, “Prevention of Violent Conflict and the Coherence of EU Policies Towards the Horn of Africa: A Case Study on the 1992-95 Post-conflict Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Uganda,” InterAfrica Group, Saferworld, 1 October 2000.

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Special Needs

Children & DDR

Disarmament & Children, UN Disarmament Commission,

<http://disarmament.un.org:8080/child/index.html>

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/English/index.html>

“Child Soldiers” & “Small Arms,” UNICEF,

http://www.unicef.org/emerg/index_issues.html

“Child and Young Adult Soldiers: Recruitment Prevention, Demobilization, & Reintegration,” Global Information Networks in Education,

<http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/>

Beth Verhey, “Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating,” World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series, 1 November 2001.

<http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp23.pdf>

Women, Girl Soldiers, & DDR

Nathalie de Watteville, “Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs,” Africa Region Working Paper Series. The World Bank, 1 May 2002.

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Reaching Critical Will, a project of The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/>

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HIV/AIDS & DDR

“Demobilization and its Implications for HIV/AIDS,” International Center for Migration and Health, October 2002.

http://www.certi.org/publications/demob/Demobilization_Final.html

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